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A B S T R A C T   
Intensive erosion has affected the coastal zone of Cotonou for several decades. An analysis of satellite images 
showed an average coastline retreat of 115 m in the study area over the period 2002–2013 with several hundred 
houses destroyed. Since 2014, a stabilisation of the coastline is observed. This study aimed at identifying the at- 
risk population and at analysing the perceptions of people who experience and those who manage coastal erosion 
risk, as well as the responses adopted. Based on four criteria and their hierarchy, we identified five profiles of 
inhabitants in this risk zone. (1) Wealthy people who leave the zone when they are affected or (2) fall into the 
category of people in danger in case they cannot migrate. (3) Fishermen who deliberately stay near the sea. (4) 
The most precarious people, trapped in the risk zone. Finally, (5) poor newcomers who continually increase the 
at-risk population. With the recent stabilisation of the coastline, the national authorities manage the “hazard” 
component of the risk. However, the majority of the population is not serene. The anthropogenic stress linked to 
evictions gradually replaced the stress to be engulfed by the sea. We conclude that the “vulnerability” component 
of the risk is not yet resolved. All categories of the population in this sensitive area need to be secured. Coop-
eration among multiple levels of governance, the application of land use planning regulations and of the Kampala 
Convention and the involvement of local communities are all measures which will enable to meet this objective.   
1. Introduction 
Coastal erosion is defined as the invasion of land by the sea, or as the 
tendency of the coastline to retreat, generating significant loss of bea-
ches, land and ecosystems that are used for human activities [1]. Sea 
level rise can trigger coastal and riverbank erosion, flooding and salt-
water intrusion into lakes [2–4]. Moreover, waves that break closer to 
the shore cause beach erosion in discrete time steps in the form of storms 
[5,6]. Human influence in the coastal area has been generally identified 
as a major cause of shoreline morphological change, which ultimately 
drives coastal erosion [7,8]. In the future, this type of erosion will very 
likely be amplified by sea level rise, changes in wave conditions and 
more frequent storms as consequences of global warming [3,8–12]. 
Amongst the coastal areas that are particularly at risk of climate change, 
those located on the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa rank very high [13, 
14]. According to Touré et al. [15]; the West African coasts are under-
going a significant erosive process, which can be impressive in some 
places with average retreats exceeding 10 m per year. The city of 
Cotonou, the economic capital of Benin, is built on alluvial sand with a 
maximum thickness of 4 m [4] between Lake Nokoue in the North and 
the Gulf of Benin1 in the South (Fig. 1). In the east of the harbour, the 
coastline of Cotonou retreated by 400 m between 1963 and 1997 ac-
cording to Codjia [16]. Based on a detailed analysis of remote sensing 
data and verified ground truth, Kaki et al. [17] observed a coastal 
erosion of nearly 500 m between 1963 and 2005 in the same area. In this 
case, the coastal erosion is mainly due to (i) the obstruction of the littoral 
transit by the deep-water harbour and its pier built in the early 1960s, 
(ii) the decreasing transport of river sediments from the upstream 
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catchment (Mono River) since the construction of the Nangbéto Dam in 
1987, and (iii) the decrease in sedimentary inputs from the West because 
of diverse coastal protection structures [18–20]. Moreover, activities of 
sand quarries and beach sand mining [17,21] have amplified the phe-
nomenon in Benin, as in Ghana [22–24]. 
Defined as the potential of a given area to be harmed by the impact of 
erosion and quantified by comparing the intensity of the impact with the 
adaptability of the system [25], the vulnerability to coastal erosion is 
particularly high in West Africa. The Gambia, Ghana, Togo, and Benin 
and Nigeria have the most vulnerable coastal communities with people 
suffering tremendous economic losses, destruction of homes, livelihoods 
and cultural artefacts [26]. Urbanisation in African cities is shaped by 
the combination of past and current governmental planning practices, 
traditional land ownership systems, private development interests, 
direct foreign investments, and migration. The interaction of these 
drivers creates hazard-prone areas in settlements facing an increase in 
the risk of natural disasters [27]. Coastal erosion and sea flooding are 
serious problems that affect the safety and livelihoods of many dwellers 
along the West African coast [28]. As in other parts of the world, the 
coast of the Gulf of Guinea concentrates the biggest cities of the region 
and a large proportion of the population [29,30]). Coastal areas, char-
acterised by high-density populations [31,32] are growing rapidly, 
notably because of rural-urban migration inflows [20,33]. Worldwide, a 
large proportion of urban expansion is taking place as informal settle-
ments in areas exposed to environmental hazards (low-lying places, 
coastal areas …) [34,35]. The rapid increase in coastal populations 
imposes more pressure on coastal lands through alteration of natural 
habitats and leads to increased erosion [7,36]. People living in these 
coastal areas that lack basic infrastructure and services are dispropor-
tionately affected by the impacts of climate change [37,38]. Moreover, 
both, rapid demographic growth and inadequate resources for urban 
development exacerbate their vulnerability. Actually, population 
growth in coastal areas places more people potentially at risk from 
natural hazards, which could mean that post-disaster displacement and 
migration from coastal areas will increase in the future [39–41]. Sea 
level rise is expected to cause most migration in the next decades [42]. 
According to Appeaning Addo [7]; various studies have quantified the 
rate of landward change with regard to the position of the coastline but 
not much work has been done to estimate the rate at which human 
settlements are moving closer to the coastline. In addition, there is a 
large research gap regarding the responses of households, communities, 
and states towards coastal erosion and sea level rise [43]. 
The main objectives of this study are to identify populations living in 
a coastal area of Cotonou affected by rapid erosion for several decades 
and to analyse the perceptions of and responses to risks by those who 
experience the risks and those who manage the risks. 
1.1. Study area 
The study area comprises 8 km along the sea (Gulf of Benin) to the 
east of the Siafato groyne2 built in 1962–1963 just after the harbour 
(Fig. 1). This zone has been significantly eroded since the early 1960s. 
Prior to this, the coastline was linear. In 2013, seven groynes, one at 
every kilometer from the Siafato groyne, have been implanted along the 
coast as coastal protection measures (see Fig. 1, below, Groyne 1 to 
Groyne 7) and two additional intermediate groynes (the first one be-
tween Groyne 1 and Groyne 2 and the second one between Groyne 6 and 
Groyne 7) have recently been integrated (April 2018). As shown in 
Fig. 1, the series of groynes have been constructed up to the adminis-
trative limit of the municipality of Cotonou, neighboured by the mu-
nicipality of Sèmè-Podji. The study area is also characterised by high- 
density housing to the limits of the beach. As shelter types, we find 
standing houses, permanent houses, makeshift houses and some plots of 
land free of any construction. While some zones of the coastal area are 
Fig. 1. Location of (top) and zoom on (down) the study area on a satellite image recorded on December 08, 2015.  
2 Groynes are long, narrow structures constructed from timber, sheet piling, 
concrete or boulders perpendicular or slightly oblique to the shoreline. They are 
designed to reduce along-shore currents and littoral drift, and to retain the 
beach sand [72]. 
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more endowed with permanent houses and other zones are more dedi-
cated to temporary housing, we mainly observe a mix of these dwellings, 
especially closer to the coastline. Whether it is due to the construction of 
the groynes (storage of materials) or sanitation of the area, the author-
ities have regularly forced demolition of makeshift shelter and eviction 
of the inhabitants. 
2. Methodology 
We used the triangulation method to obtain data and adopted a 
multidisciplinary approach to analyse the social and management 
problems posed by coastal erosion. The triangulation method allows the 
acquisition of data from various angles, while taking into account the 
scale of the research study [26]. The multidisciplinary approach focuses 
primarily on the different disciplines and the diverse perspectives they 
bring to understand an issue. In practice, to meet our objectives, we 
proceeded in an estimation of the progression of coastal erosion in the 
study area based on satellite images available in Google Earth and in a 
long term study of risk perception and responses based on data from two 
fieldwork trips (semi-structured interviews with residents and stake-
holders in July 2014, and questionnaires with residents and 
semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in May 2018).  
* Step 1 - Assessing the changes in the study area 
We used a set of recent very high-resolution satellite images recorded 
from 2002 up to 2018. Multi-temporal analyses have been carried out in 
a Geographical Information System (GIS) to assess the coastline retreat 
between 2002 and 2018 and to observe the dynamic of human settle-
ments in the risk zone during the same time period. Concretely, we 
compared some couples of images in order to estimate, by photo- 
interpretation, the land lost to the sea between date pairs and to count 
the houses engulfed or destroyed by the encroachment of the sea in a 
first time and the new houses built in the risk zone in a second time. 
Based on the average household sizes published by the “Institut National 
de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Économique” (INSAE), we then assessed 
the number of people affected by house destruction and the number of 
people moving in a new house, including makeshift houses. According to 
the fact that important protection measures of the coast (seven groynes) 
have been implemented in 2013, we have defined two main reference 
study periods: 2002–2013 and 2014–2018. Images recorded in 2002, 
2013, 2014 and 2018 were primarily analysed but we also used other 
images (notably 2004, 2011, 2015) to obtain information about inter-
mediate situations. We complemented this analysis with on-site obser-
vations and photographs taken during several fieldwork trips conducted 
in November 2012, September 2013, July 2014, February 2015 and May 
2018.  
* Step 2 - Identifying the populations in the study area 
In July 2014, a few months after the completion of the coastal pro-
tection measures, we collected testimonies from 20 residents located 
within a maximal distance of 150 m of the coastline in the risk area. 
These respondents were chosen randomly along the beach in the study 
area, however there was an effort to choose residents of different shelter 
types (standing house, permanent house, makeshift house). They were 
asked to tell their story in the local language (Fongbe). We recorded, in a 
notebook and with the help of an interpreter (Fongbe-French), evidence 
relating to their origin, their movement(s) and those of their relatives 
and past/current neighbours, their activities, their perception of risks, 
their fears and their strategies to protect themselves against impacts of 
erosion. Based on direct data (relating to respondents) and indirect data 
(relating to the parents/relatives/neighbours of the respondents), we 
carried out a typology of populations in the study area using four criteria 
of differentiation of residents (house with a permanent structure, 
standing house, activity and long-time residents) organised following a 
dichotomic tree. After that, we analysed how respondents perceived risk 
and which strategies they implemented.  
* Step 3 - Determining the risk perception and the responses of 
inhabitants 
In May 2018, five years after the completion of the coastal protection 
measures, we carried out a questionnaire survey with about thirty close 
questions and a few open questions among 37 individuals settled within 
a maximal distance of 150 m of the coastline in the study area. These 
respondents were approached by chance but they were chosen based on 
a maximum possible spatial distribution in the study area. The purpose 
was to collect respondents’ perceptions of the dynamics of the coastline, 
the effectiveness of protection structures and coastal development pol-
icies. Collected data have been encoded in a spreadsheet. By combining 
these data with data obtained by testimonies in July 2014, we analysed 
how inhabitants of the study area perceived risk and which strategies 
they implemented in response to risk in five periods of time corre-
sponding to the timeline of the construction of the seven groynes to 
protect the zone (before 2013, in 2013, a few months after, five years 
after, and in the future).  
* Step 4 - Analysing the risk perception of stakeholders 
In 2014, we conducted eight semi-structured interviews with stake-
holders engaged in coastal protection (representatives of the local au-
thorities (2), regional authorities (1), national authorities (1), national 
agency (1), residents’ association (1) + actors implicated in reduction of 
climate change impacts (2)) about their opinion as regards the efficiency 
of structural measures. We also had discussion on the matter with 
Beninese researchers working in the field of environment, geology, hy-
drology and law. In 2018, we interviewed seven persons among stake-
holders engaged in coastal protection (representatives of the local 
authorities (2), regional authorities (1), national authorities (1), resi-
dents’ association (1) + civil engineer (1) and actor engaged in coastal 
management (1)) about their perceptions of the dynamics of the coast-
line, the effectiveness of protection structures, current coastal develop-
ment policies and future prospects. Thanks to interview transcription, it 
was possible to highlight keywords and make connections between an-
swers. Analyses of the answers allowed us to understand the risk 
perception of authorities and stakeholders just after and five years after 
the completion of the coastal protection measures. All of these re-
spondents remain anonymous in this paper. 
3. Results 
3.1. Changes in the study area 
3.1.1. From 2002 to the installation of seven groynes in 2013 
Between 2002 and 2013, we measured a generalised coastline retreat 
in the study area of about 115 m with local variations from 38 to 145 m 
(Fig. 2). On these estimations of coastline regression measurement, we 
considered 5 m as a margin of error that may arise from natural in-
fluences on the position of the coastline (winds, tides), imprecisions 
related to the images (ortho-rectification, mosaic) and measurement 
uncertainties (digitalisation and photo-interpretation). Our estimations 
are consistent with results published by Codjia [16] and Kaki [17] for 
previous periods. It corresponds to an erosion rate of on average 10.5 m 
per year, which is well above the rate considered as high by 
Frick-Trzebitzky and colleagues [27] that cited the example of a loss of 
1 m per year measured between 2005 and 2011 in Glefe (Ghana) by 
Amoani et al. [22]. 
This period is also characterised by the implementation of measures 
to reduce erosion by the authorities. Under the pressure of some local 
and regional associations for the protection of the environment, all 
marine sand quarries were closed in March 2009 (Decree No. 2008–615 
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of October 22, 2008). The exploitation of lagoon sand has replaced the 
exploitation of marine sand. This was a positive but not sufficient 
measure to stop the erosion that we still observed during the next years. 
Following the national strategy to implement the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Benin proposed two adaptive options: 
the relocation of economic activities, communication networks, hotel 
infrastructures and communities and the stabilisation of the coastline by 
groynes [44]. In 2013, seven groynes, one every kilometer, were built in 
the east of the Siafato groyne in the most exposed and densely occupied 
zone (our study area). 
The loss of land to the sea (nearly 93 ha in the study area from 2002 
to 2013) had major impacts on human settlements. By photo- 
interpretation, we estimated that about 800 houses disappeared 
because of the encroachment of the sea. This corresponds to 60 standing 
houses spread over 104 enclosed parcels and about 750 makeshift 
houses (informal settlements) (see Fig. 2 for the Western part of the 
study area, especially concerned by loss of makeshifts houses). Consid-
ering the average household size3 of 3.9 persons [45], this means that at 
least 3100 individuals were likely to be affected by coastal erosion and 
forced to leave their homes during this period. The destruction of the 
standing houses is often progressive (Fig. 3, top) while makeshift houses 
may be destroyed by the sea within a few hours during a storm event 
(Fig. 3, down). In addition, authorities had proceeded with the demo-
lition of makeshift houses and the eviction of their residents. For 
instance, in 2009, such destruction by authorities concerned 115 addi-
tional makeshift houses, which corresponds to about 450 additional 
individuals. The use of intermediate satellite images - in this case, 
recorded in 2011 - allowed to observe a replacement of standing houses 
by makeshift houses between 2002 and 2011, followed by rapid 
destruction of a number of these new makeshift houses between 2011 
and 2013. Therefore, we can conclude that the number of destroyed 
makeshift houses over this 2002–2013 period is largely underestimated. 
3.1.2. From 2014 to 2018 
Since 2014, we observed a general stabilisation of the coastline in the 
study area corresponding to the protected zone by seven groynes 
installed in 2013. This is consistent with recent measurements made by 
Makponse and Hounsou [46]. Very local variations have been observed 
at the scale of a groyne with a positive effect (accretion) on the west side 
and a negative effect (fast erosion) on the east side. In addition, signif-
icant erosion is visible in the eastern part of the study area in the 
neighbouring municipality of Cotonou, Sèmè-Podji (Fig. 4). For the next 
kilometres east of the protected area, a coastal erosion rate of 49 m per 
year has been calculated for the 2014–2018 period. It is frequent that 
measures to protect coasts induce unwanted effects - caused by littoral 
drift - on adjacent beaches [47,48]. 
The installation of protection infrastructures also leads to some 
consequences in terms of human settlements: it restores confidence in 
the safety of the area of landowners and investors who are starting to 
build new standing houses and resorts in the now protected zone and 
new blocks of buildings and housing are currently under construction. 
By photo-interpretation, we observed the recent establishment of 2 
standing houses and 3 large buildings in the study area. In addition, the 
gradual accumulation of sediment between groynes increases the feeling 
of safety in population. From the Siafato groyne to the groyne 1, we 
counted 78 new makeshift houses in enclosed parcels. Between the 
groyne 2 and the end of the study area, there are 37 new makeshift 
houses. Recent official figures give 4.2 persons as the average household 
size in this zone of Cotonou [49]. Therefore, as a result of the relative 
stabilisation of the coastline, at least 480 people settled very close to the 
sea in the risk zone, their safety depending for the most part on the 
effectiveness of the protection structures. Inversely, some disappear-
ances of makeshift houses and informal settlements, specifically of these 
located outside enclosed parcels in the study area, have been observed 
on the most recent satellites images. This appears as evidence for a will 
to “cleanse” the coastal area (i.e. through demolitions of makeshift 
shelters and evictions of their residents) to give way to a tourism-related 
development and allow the coast gentrification [50], now that coastline 
seems stabilised. 
3.2. Who are the people who settle in this risk zone and how do they 
respond to erosion risks? 
Testimonies of respondents recorded during the fieldwork in July 
2014 and further elaboration based on the four criteria of differentiation 
of residents (house with a permanent structure, standing house, activity 
and long-time residents) have led to five typical profiles of people pre-
sent in the study area: wealthy people, people in danger, fishermen, 
precarious people and poor newcomers (Fig. 5). 
Analyses of respondents’ stories allowed us to identify their own 
movements (“direct”) and those of their relatives/neighbours (“indi-
rect”). Obviously, movements inside the risk zone and from the risk zone 
to other places may represent a response to risks. We also observed that 
people belonging in the same category presented similarities in terms of 
origin and trajectories (Fig. 7). 
Fig. 2. Evolution of the coastline in the Western part of the study area between 2002 and 2013.  
3 For the department of Littoral-Cotonou. 
F. de Longueville et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 51 (2020) 101882
5
- Wealthy people (green in Fig. 7) [0 direct, dozen by 8 indirect, 
several dozen by local authorities4]: they live inside standing houses 
located in the coastal area. If their houses are threatened by the sea, 
they leave the risk zone thanks to their financial and social capital. 
According to evidence, when they move they relocate inland, usually 
to the peripheral areas of Cotonou (Calavi, Sèmè-Podji …) or beyond 
(Porto Novo). This information was provided indirectly by people 
that lived in the ruins of destroyed houses. A man told us: « Nous 
habitons actuellement contre la clôture de plusieurs maisons en dur 
qui ont ́eté détruites par la mer. Les propriétaires de ces maisons sont 
partis vivre chez des parents à eux. » [“We currently live against the 
fence of several houses with a permanent structure that have been 
destroyed by the sea. The owners of these houses went to live with 
their parents.“]. A fisherman said: « Ma famille est établie ici avec 
d’autres familles de pêcheurs. C’est la parcelle d’un proche qui était 
propriétaire de la maison effondrée, il est parti vivre ̀a Calavi. » [“My 
family is here with other fishing families. This is the parcel of a 
relative who was the owner of the collapsed house, he went to live in 
Calavi.“]  
- People in danger (purple in Fig. 7) [3 direct, dozen by 2 indirect, 
several dozen by local authorities]: they have an ownership title and 
Fig. 3. Progressive destruction of standing houses (top) and rapid destruction of makeshift houses (down) (Photos: P. Ozer and F. de Longueville).  
Fig. 4. Rapid erosion in the east of the protected zone.  
4 Read: “there were 0 wealthy people among our respondents, dozens of 
wealthy people have been evoked by 8 of our respondents and local authorities 
evoked several dozens of wealthy people”. 
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live again in houses with a permanent structure located in the study 
area, currently very close to the stretch of the sea. Two cases were 
observed: older houses protected with sandbags and big stones and 
more recent houses, deliberately unfinished because of the risk to be 
destroyed. If these houses are destroyed by the sea, their inhabitants 
will not have the financial and social capitals to move to safe areas 
and would become precarious people in the risk zone.  
- Fishermen (blue in Fig. 7) [7 direct, hundreds by 4 indirect, hundreds 
by local authorities]: they are native of the region of Grand-Popo (on 
the coast 90 km west of Cotonou) or from parents born in the region 
of Grand-Popo. They arrived in this coastal area in the early 1970s to 
enjoy better living conditions and more employment opportunities. 
Since their arrival, they have made successive movements along the 
coastline because of the progressive sea’s encroachment. Their first 
establishments are now up to 500 m into the sea. A fisherman told us: 
« Je fais des déplacements successifs depuis le temps de mes parents. 
Il faut toujours reculer un peu mais rester proche de la mer. » [“I 
made several successive movements since the time of my parents. 
You always have to step back a bit at the same time staying close to 
the sea.“] Sometimes, they were evicted by a landowner or by the 
authorities, notably in the framework of work for coast protection 
between 2009 and 2013. The resulting loss of assets and capital 
necessary for building a new house caused their vulnerability to in-
crease with each movement. Fishermen have been now and then 
sensitised by the authorities to leave the risk zone but they wanted to 
stay there to remain close to their economic activities. Another 
fisherman said: « Je suis un pêcheur, issue d’une famille de pêcheurs, 
je ne peux rien faire d’autre, je dois rester près de la mer, c’est 
seulement la mort qui peut me séparer de la mer. » [“As a fisherman 
from a fishing family, I cannot do anything else, I have to stay close to 
the sea, it is only death that can separate me from the sea.“]  
- Precarious people (red in Fig. 7) [7 direct, hundred by 3 indirect, 
thousands by local authorities]: these people became poor in the risk 
zone after the destruction of their house by the sea’s encroachment 
Fig. 5. Typology of the population in the study area (source: data recorded during the fieldwork in 2014).  
Fig. 6. Example of a very short movement of one household (red cross: house of origin, green circle: house of destination).  
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and without resources to leave the risk zone. They were born in the 
coastal area or came from other districts of Cotonou, as from the zone 
converted into the large market of Danktopa in the 1960s. Originally, 
they often owned a house with permanent structure (brick walls), 
located ‘in the current sea’, i.e. several hundred meters from the 
current coastline. At that time, their houses were (very) far from the 
sea. Because of the progressive sea’s encroachment, they lost their 
house and their land and have made successive movements, some-
times of a few meters, in the risk zone (Fig. 6). Some had made a 
dozen of short movements in the last 10 years. They squatted in the 
deserted damaged houses, built their makeshift house behind the 
ruins of destroyed villas or protected them with the bricks moved 
from old walls. An owner of a house engulfed in the sea told us: « 
Notre maison a été détruite il y a 8 ans, nous sommes ici depuis 1 an 
sur le terrain d’une connaissance partie vers Porto Novo. Quand nous 
sommes arrivés la mer était plus loin mais aujourd’hui nous avons 
vraiment peur, nous sommes en train d’amener nos briques plus loin 
dans une autre parcelle plus éloignée de la mer. » [“Our house was 
destroyed 8 years ago; we have been here for 1 year on a parcel of an 
acquaintance who has gone to Porto Novo. When we arrived, the sea 
was further away but today we are really afraid, we are carrying our 
bricks to another parcel further away from the sea.“]. These coping 
strategies are very temporary allowing at best to gain a few months 
while their makeshift houses may be engulfed by the sea within a few 
hours during a storm event. A woman said: « Nous écoutons et 
observons la mer. C’est le bruit qui donne l’alerte et le fait qu’avec le 
haut des vagues on ne voit plus l’horizon. Dans ces cas-là, une per-
sonne dort à même le sol et réveille les autres rapidement si l’eau 
rentre dans la maison car en quelques minutes, l’eau peut tout 
emporter. » [“We listen and observe the sea. It is the noise that gives 
the warning and the fact that with the top of the waves we no longer 
see the horizon. In these cases, one of us sleeps on the floor and 
wakes up the others quickly if the water enters the house because, in 
a few minutes, the water can take everything away.“]. These pre-
carious people wanted to leave the risk zone but due to the lack of 
necessary resources to re-establish livelihoods elsewhere, they 
become exposed to increasingly severe environmental shocks and 
stresses in situ.  
- Poor newcomers (orange in Fig. 7) [3 direct, a dozen by 1 indirect]: 
people who arrived recently in the risk zone from rural areas or other 
countries of the sub-region. Interviews have taught us that some 
households even came from abroad (e.g. Togo, Nigeria). They were 
already poor before their settlement in this zone and had no money 
to pay rent elsewhere in the city. A woman from Togo told us: « Je 
suis venue pour travailler, je fais des ménages. Je n’ai pas trouvé de 
chambre moins chère en dehors de cette zone. Et il y avait de l’espace 
libre … Je suis arrivée après les autres et quelques personnes sont 
encore arrivées après moi. » [“I came to work, I did housework. I 
could not find a cheaper room outside that area. And there was free 
space … I came after the others but a few people still came after 
me.“] In rapidly expanding cities and in the absence of space for 
settlement accessible to the urban poor, more-at-risk zones are likely 
to house a larger proportion of the lower-income population [51,52]. 
In Cotonou, these people live in informal settlements that they built 
on land where the owner is unknown. They move slightly when the 
sea threatens them or when their precarious house is destroyed by 
the waves. 
3.3. Risk perception and responses of inhabitants 
Based on data recorded during the surveys carried out with residents 
in 2014 and in 2018, we mapped the rate of affected people, their 
emotions towards coastal erosion and its impacts, their perception of the 
effectiveness of the groynes and their responses to risk on a timeline 
presenting the periods of the construction of coastal protection struc-
tures (in 2013) as the reference (Fig. 8). 
Before the coastal protection by the groynes in 2013, the vast ma-
jority of people settled in the study area was affected by erosion and 
almost all used movements as a response to risk (Fig. 8). This is in line 
with the (micro) movements widely mentioned as common measures by 
fishermen, precarious people and poor newcomers in the testimonies 
collected in July 2014. Without other alternatives, they often adopted 
several very temporary coping strategies. Also, according to the 2018 
survey, anxiety was a feeling shared by many people before 2013 and it 
appeared that installation of groynes brought serenity to most of the 
inhabitants (Fig. 8). In July 2014, all respondents reported being 
affected by erosion. Almost three-quarter of respondents feared the sea 
and one on five was more afraid of eviction, by the landowner or au-
thorities. One respondent evoked the fear of the sea and the fear of 
eviction and only one did not talk about fear (Fig. 8). A few months after 
the installation of the protection structures, only 3 of the respondents 
had already observed a positive effect of groynes, 14 said they did not 
see a positive effect and 3 respondents thought the situation had got 
worse since the building of the groynes (Fig. 8). 
The survey carried out in May 2018 showed that almost all re-
spondents (n = 37) recognised the effectiveness of the coastal protection 
Fig. 7. Representation of the main movements of different profiles of people (source: data recorded during the survey in 2014 and in 2018).  
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measures 5 years after their construction but only a small number lived 
in serenity while the others were a little (half of respondents) or not (one 
third of respondents) serene (Fig. 8). Despite the relatively high level of 
satisfaction among respondents who had experienced the effectiveness 
of the groynes to protect the coast, only one third of respondents 
believed that more groynes would be sufficient to protect them perma-
nently. Moreover, with stabilisation of the coastline, four respondents on 
ten feared eviction and seven on ten wanted to leave the coastal area but 
had no alternative (Fig. 8). One of the respondents said: « Nous ne 
savons où aller, nous dormons à la belle étoile ou sous des abris faits en 
pagne en priant que la pluie ne s’abatte sur nous. En cette période de 
saison pluvieuse, cela ne saurait tarder. En plus, nous vivons dans la peur 
constante qu’ils ne viennent nous déguerpir à nouveau d’ici. Tous nos 
ustensiles ont été saccagés et nous n’arrivons même plus à nous nourrir 
comme avant. Les enfants ne peuvent plus aller à l’école car d’où nous 
avons trouvé refuge, ils ne peuvent se rendre à pied à leur école compte 
Fig. 8. Risk perceptions and responses of inhabitants (source: data recorded during the survey in 2014 (in brown) and in 2018 (in blue)).  
Fig. 9. Risk perception of stakeholders (sources: semi-structured inteviews carried out in 2014 (in brown) and in 2018 (in blue)).  
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tenu de la distance et je n’ai pas de quoi leur payer le déplacement ». 
[“We do not know where to go, we sleep in the open or under shelters 
made from loincloth praying that the rain will not fall on us. In this 
period of the rainy season, we don’t have to wait for long. Besides, we 
live in constant fear that they will come and evict us again. All our 
equipment has been destroyed, and we cannot even feed ourselves as 
before. Children can no longer go to school because from where we 
found shelter, they can’t walk to their school regarding the distance and 
I don’t have enough money to pay for their transport.“] 
3.4. Risk perception of stakeholders 
When we talked about the risk during the semi-structured interviews 
in 2014, the representative of the national authorities, as well as the 
member of the residents’ association, immediately pointed out the 
construction of the harbour as being responsible for the coastal erosion 
in that area (Fig. 9). According to one of the Beninese researchers (a 
geologist) who we met at the university in 2014, it was known that the 
construction of the harbour would create problems as it can be read in a 
publication of Sireyjol [53]. And this has also been repeated by the civil 
engineer interviewed in 2018 who said: « c’est le port qui a assez dévié 
les courants pour créer le déficit ̀a l’est … peut-être que le prolongement 
de l’épi d’arrêt de sable an un peu aggravé la chose mais le port est assez 
grand pour avoir causé ce qu’on voit maintenant, donc le mal était déjà 
fait avec le port » [“it’s the harbour that has deviated marine currents 
enough to create the deficit to the east … it is possible that the extension 
of the sand stop groyne made it a little worse but the harbour is big 
enough to have caused what we see now, so the damage was already 
done with the harbour]. The respondents from the local and regional 
authorities rather mentioned the consequences of this coastal erosion, 
namely 2 km and 1 km respectively of land submerged in the sea in this 
area. 
Relating to vulnerability, two main elements emerged from the semi- 
structured interviews carried out in 2014 and 2018. The first relates to 
the question of legality (“illegally occupied sites”, “informal settlement”, 
“prohibit”, “laws”) and the second to the notion of movement (“imme-
diate movement”, “evictions”, “to displace populations”, “displaced”, 
“dislodge”) (Fig. 9). Concerning the first one (the question of legality), a 
Beninese researcher (environmental sciences) said that there is a major 
risk for the population settling in the zone. According to him, adminis-
tratively, no settlement is allowed in this area but, in reality, the situa-
tion is more complicated because the land has been acquired by 
individuals prior to the erosion problem.5 As the land belongs to in-
dividuals, prohibitions are difficult according to the local authorities. 
According to another Beninese researcher (law), the problem is the 
absence of implementing regulations of laws and/or their non- 
application where they are available, non-compliance with legal texts 
due to the lack of mechanisms to compel communities to meet legal 
requirements. Moreover, he said that there is a lack of knowledge of 
these legal texts by local population and a low outreach of their content. 
Next to that, there is the sensitive issue of informal settlements. Local 
and regional authorities seemed to be overwhelmed by this situation. 
Concerning the second one (the notion of movement), every single 
stakeholder talked about the movements of formal residents and/or 
informal residents and their comments expressed the complexity of the 
situation. Dynamics of the at-risk populations have also been mentioned 
by other stakeholders interviewed in 2014. For one of the actors engaged 
in climate change adaptation, there is no other solution than to dislodge 
people (referring to informal residents) and for the agent of the national 
agency, mandatory displacements are needed in case of coastal erosion, 
especially for those who could be hosted by relatives (relating to formal 
residents). 
Results also indicated that stakeholders involved in erosion risk 
management have similar perceptions of the effectiveness of coastal 
protection structures (Fig. 9). In 2014, just after the finishing of the 
phase I, regional authorities put a lot of hope in the groynes to solve the 
problem and local authorities highlighted that the situation would be 
worse without groynes. However, perceptions collected in 2018 differ 
somewhat between stakeholders in terms of their long-term effective-
ness. While a very high satisfaction was expressed from national au-
thorities (“groynes more effective than expected”), not sufficient action 
for coastal management by national authorities was mentioned by the 
local authorities and questionable sustainability of the solution was 
mentioned by the residents’ association. The implementation of the 
phase II has shown that the phase I indeed was not sufficient but also 
proved that there was a follow-up to fight this phenomenon even though 
a researcher said that the government’s action came late. 
Finally, all stakeholders mentioned that the problem has been 
transferred to the East of Cotonou, but they did not seem concerned 
about the situation that, according to respondents, should be tackled by 
the national and local authorities (Fig. 9). 
4. Discussion of results 
The coastal erosion recorded in Cotonou, leading to coastline retreat 
and subsequent land loss, would not be an issue of concern if it had not 
affected local populations, infrastructures and economic development. 
In this part, we successively discuss the (im-)mobility of people in the 
risk zone and the comparison between people who experience the risk 
and those who manage the risk. 
4.1. (Im-)mobility of people in the risk zone 
Our results are consistent with the findings of a recent study con-
ducted in a coastal area of Ghana showing a non-linear relationship 
between environmental risk and migration and demonstrating the 
complexity of the migration process and decision-making [54]. We 
showed that only the wealthy people, a minority of directly affected 
people in our study area, definitely leave the coastal area of Cotonou if 
they are sure no protection can be efficient. These are, strictly speaking, 
the only people who migrate out of the risk zone, and this is made 
possible because they have the necessary social and/or financial capital. 
For the precarious population, the lack of sufficient resources hinders 
their migration as an adaptation strategy and limits the potentially 
available migration destinations [55]. These people are involuntary 
non-migrants as defined by Carling [56]; they are “trapped” in the risk 
zone [57,58]. Before the stabilisation of the coastline by groynes, these 
people, unable to leave, simply made short perpendicular or parallel 
movements close to the coastline and feared to be engulfed by the sea. 
This confirms previous case studies which proved that it is not generally 
the poorest people who migrate [40] and that environmental factors 
intermingle with social and economic drivers to trigger the migration 
decision [59,60]. The case of fishermen is particular and adds a new 
dimension to the concept of the immobile population. Indeed, in 2014, 
they were not satisfied with the new infrastructure to protect the coast 
and feared being engulfed by the sea while in 2018, they wanted to stay 
close to the coastline for their activities, but they feared that they will be 
evicted. In the risk zone, they are voluntary non-migrants as identified 
by Carling [56] and need to be protected as well as precarious people. 
Based on these results, we claim that the widespread statement that if 
coastal at-risk settlers do not adapt in any way, land and property can be 
lost and migration will be a direct consequence of coastal erosion [43] 
needs to be qualified. Moreover, it is too simplistic to count people who 
are settled in a low-level area to predict future migration caused by sea 
level rise. Finally, our results highlight that the coastal area of Cotonou 
receives more migrants (poor newcomers) than it loses (wealthy 
5 It was only in 1995 that all residents in unsuitable coastal areas got resti-
tution by receiving new parcels. Apart from this case, only households who had 
been displaced as a result of protective work had been compensated against 
leaving. 
F. de Longueville et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 51 (2020) 101882
10
people). This is consistent with available literature suggesting that 
globally, there is a net-migration into hazardous areas [61–63]. 
In this kind of area characterised by highly dynamic settlements 
[64], our study illustrates that coastal erosion leads thus to a rear-
rangement of relative social vulnerability in the risk zone, as in Densu 
Delta in Ghana [27]. Image analyses showed that one enclosed parcel 
originally destined for one villa hosts a dozen makeshift houses a few 
years later (see Fig. 10, below, in white, green and blue circles). Today, 
most of these precarious houses do no longer exist because they were 
destroyed during evictions in 2018 in order to regain the good reputa-
tion of this stabilised area that will now be developed for the purpose of 
tourism [65]. As the detection of area-wide fast-moving processes re-
mains very difficult in developing countries due to the lack of official 
statistics [66] and data about small disasters [38], we showed that the 
comparison of satellite images can be a useful tool. It was impossible to 
find the same people for the survey in 2014 and 2018, which further 
highlights the rapidity of settlement changes in the study area. 
4.2. Comparison between people who experience the risk and those who 
manage the risk 
It is known that the risk perception of non-experts (i.e. inhabitants of 
the risk zone) is different from the perception and knowledge of the 
“experts” and managers [67,68]. A study led in Brittany (France) 
showed that the inhabitants most directly concerned by coastal risks 
tend to underestimate the impact of coastal risks [69]. The situation 
seemed to be different in the context of Cotonou where the vast majority 
of inhabitants knows the problems related to the risk of erosion, having 
been and/or being directly affected by the effects of coastal erosion. A 
previous study led in Benin showed differences in risk perception 
depending on many factors, for example their ethnicity, education and 
age [70]. Facing the coastal erosion risk, most of the inhabitants met 
during our fieldworks adopted very temporary coping strategies because 
of lack of other choices. We also saw that their feelings change quickly 
depending on events, and that the reduction of hazard through the 
implementation of coastal protection structures, whose effectiveness is 
widely recognised, is not sufficient to render them serene. Today, 
beyond the uncertainty about the long-term effectiveness of these 
groynes, it is above all the fear linked to evictions that dominates for 
inhabitants, in particular for fishermen, the precarious population and 
poor newcomers. 
The vision of the component “hazard” of the risk is common for all 
levels of stakeholders: coastal erosion, mainly explained by the con-
struction of the harbour, leads to a significant loss of land to the sea. 
There are sometimes differences of opinion on the extent of the erosion 
problem and impacts, but all agree on the problem. During an interview, 
a respondent from the local authorities strongly affected by coastal 
erosion and house loss said « … plus de 1 km a ́eté englouti par la mer et 
près de 2000 personnes ont ́eté déplacées de ce fait … » [”… more than 1 
km of land has been engulfed by the sea and nearly 2000 people have 
been displaced due to this …“]. Another respondent of local authorities 
mentioned about 2 km of land lost to the sea while the loss evaluated 
from satellite image analyses was about 570 m in 2005 [17] and 700 m 
in 2018 [65]. This shows that the local authorities do not have reliable 
figures on the risk to which its inhabitants are exposed and confirms the 
importance of providing decision-makers with scientific information for 
improved action planning. 
The vision of the component “vulnerability” to the risk by stake-
holders is not as clear. Cases of individuals/households settling in formal 
settlements must be distinguished from those in informal settlements. 
While the “cleaning” of illegally occupied sites is evident for stake-
holders at the national level, our study has shown that at a local level, 
stakeholders see things differently but seemed to be overwhelmed by the 
situation. With the implementation of the phases I and II, the respondent 
from the national authorities said that the population can be reassured, 
but it appears that this was addressed only formally to the population. It 
seems that since the stabilisation of the coastline in the study area, the 
risk of coastal erosion is under control as far as risk managers are con-
cerned. A new development of the area is ongoing with new hotel in-
frastructures and sportive facilities [65]. Stakeholders were less 
interested in the risk reported further east and claimed that there exist 
projects to stop erosion. 
A hazard and vulnerability assessment of coastal erosion and sea 
flooding is an essential first step for planning and decision-making. In 
order to address the negative impacts of coastal erosion processes, pol-
icymakers, coastal managers and opinion leaders need evidence-based 
Fig. 10. Evolution of the human settlement in a part of the study area between 2002 and 2011.  
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information on the current status and forecasts of coastal vulnerability. 
Determining hot-spots of coastal vulnerability allows for proper imple-
mentation of long-term policy, such as restriction of development in 
vulnerable areas, as well as the allocation of resources in the short-term 
[3]. For vulnerability, it is therefore important to make a distinction 
between different types of residents’ profiles. The typology we have 
proposed may be useful in this respect. 
From above, we can conclude that the national authorities manage 
more or less, for the moment the component “hazard” but the compo-
nent “vulnerability” is not solved. For inhabitants of the study area, in a 
context of increasing vulnerability with time, stress linked to (semi) 
natural hazard has progressively been replaced by stress induced by late 
and incomplete human management of these processes. 
5. Final remarks 
Coastal erosion and sea flooding, as urban floods in Africa, occur as 
the results of multiple interacting social and environmental processes 
that are poorly monitored [27]. The coastal area of Cotonou, highly 
urbanised, clearly is a risk-prone zone as affected by a fast erosion for 
several decades. The speed of coastal erosion over the last two decades 
was impressive and temporary stabilisation concerned only a few kilo-
metres of coastline. Our results also show that the vulnerability of the 
population in the study area has always been strongly influenced by the 
governance of the territory. There is an urgent need to protect the 
population and to make the coastal area more resilient. A first step was 
done with the construction of the groynes, but this is not sufficient. Even 
though these structures have been efficient in containing erosion 
updrift, they engender, nevertheless severe erosion downdrift by 
blocking sand to drift along the shore [20]. Enforcement of planning 
regulations, cooperation between multiple levels of governance and 
with other countries, the involvement of local communities [70,71] and 
the application of the Kampala Convention6 are factors that applied all 
together, will allow reaching this objective. 
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le Golfe du Bénin. Exemples du Togo et du Bénin, Geo-Eco-Trop 41 (2017) 
529–541. 
[20] A. Ndour, R.A. Laïbi, M. Sadio, C.G. Degbe, A.T. Diaw, L.M. Oyédé, et al., 
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Liège, 2018, p. 47p. 
[63] O. Teka, U. Sturm-Hentschel, J. Vogt, H.-P. Bähr, S. Hinz, B. Sinsin, Process 
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